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A Question of Sovereignty:  
Tax and the Brexit Referendum 
 
 
Maria Kendrick1 
 
 
It isn't right that unelected bureaucrats in Brussels impose taxes on the poorest and elected 
British politicians can do nothing.  
   
Vote Leave2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate about sovereignty in the Brexit referendum campaign was cast in terms of power, 
competence, and ultimately freedom to legislate. The proposition that the UK could take back 
control from the EU was expressly referred to in the context of the principle of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty. Paradoxically, Parliament was purported to require an exercise in direct 
democracy, through the referendum, in order to provide the legitimacy necessary for it to 
reassert its own sovereignty to legislate over maters which fall, or were perceived to fall, within 
the competence of the EU. The question of sovereignty therefore asked which legal order 
should actually be supreme; the national or the supranational. This discussion consequently 
implies issues of territoriality as the ‘boundary line is the line of sovereignty’.3 The 
paradigmatic quality of a sovereign body is the power to tax,4 because it is inextricably linked 
with the power to govern. Consequently, and unsurprisingly, the debate on sovereignty 
included a debate on competence in taxation.  
 
A corollary to the issue of territoriality is the issue of harmonization. The latter denotes an 
eradication of difference between the territories to which it applies and in the context of 
taxation can consequently reduce individual member state control. Therefore, the objections 
voiced in the debate on sovereignty could be construed as objections to harmonization, 
especially on the subject of tax. It is however unfortunate that the result of this debate can have 
unintended consequences, specifically for the UK’s border with neighbouring Ireland. It is the 
intention of this article to discuss the constitutional theory in the context of tax.   
 
However, the constitutional theory cannot be detached from pragmatic considerations, because 
there is no escaping the fact that the debate on sovereignty does not occur in a vacuum. In 
reality, it is the economic expediencies which will be an unavoidable influence on post 
referendum policy decisions. Therefore, it is also the intention of this article to address the 
practical aspects of the referendum in relation to tax, in addition to the constitutional aspects, 
while reflecting on the questions of sovereignty and flexibility. Ironically, it is the practical 
considerations which may already be precipitating a form of unilateral Member State 
harmonization, which was not anticipated in the referendum sovereignty debate. 
                                                     
1 Visiting Lecturer in Public Law and PhD Candidate, King’s College London. 
2 Boris Johnson, Michael Gove and Gisela Stuart, ‘EU’LL never believe it’ The Sun, 30 May 2016, quoted in 
‘EU Referendum: Vote Leave wants power to axe fuel VAT’, BBC News, 31 May 2016, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36414761 (accessed 25 September 2016). 
3 Beale, ‘Jurisdiction to Tax’ [1919] 6 (XXXII) Harvard Law Review 587, 588. 
4 Ibid, 588. 
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II. SOVEREIGNTY 
 
The question of sovereignty was prayed in aid by the Leave campaign in the referendum on the 
UK’s membership of the European Union, as the quote at the start of this article indicates. It 
was done in many semantic forms and epithets but few more potent than the slogan to ‘take 
back control’. Of the many connotations to this slogan was the suggestion to take back control 
of all EU legislative influences and reinstate the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty proper. 
There is much that can be said in criticism of this point of view, not least the simplicity with 
which it was projected, in ignorance of the years of constitutional legal argument on the 
doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty regarding whether or not there has actually been any 
compromise to its potency by EU law.  
 
It is particularly noteworthy that during the House of Commons debates on the EU Referendum 
Bill, an MP quoted a well-known constitutional historian and academic as saying that 
referendums are used where it is thought that the Parliamentary system cannot provide the 
required level of legitimacy.5 Paradoxically, both politicians and lawyers alike cited the 
preservation of Parliamentary Sovereignty as the reason for supporting Brexit, whilst at the 
same time backing the use of a referendum because of a lack of legitimacy in the Parliamentary 
system.6 This Parliamentary Sovereignty paradox belies the Leave campaign. To follow the 
argument to its logical conclusion, the idea of taking back control from Brussels in order to 
return it to Parliament, which cannot of itself reassert its own sovereignty with sufficient 
legitimacy, but rather needs to rely on a form of direct democracy in order to do so, undermines 
its future legislative legitimacy when it comes to entering into and incorporating future trade 
deals or future association agreements with the EU in the post referendum reality.7 Does this 
mean that there should be a referendum in the UK on all issues that could potentially question 
sovereignty because Parliamentary action alone would be insufficiently legitimate? 
 
Consequently, the premise of the Leave campaign’s protestations on the question of 
sovereignty are certainly questionable. Furthermore, of the many legislative influences rightly, 
or wrongly, attributed to Brussels during the referendum campaign, the reach of EU law as 
regards fiscal policy was pertinently included. It is unsurprising that in the discussion as to 
which legislative body is sovereign, the debate encompassed not just issues of power and 
competence, but also territoriality. Which legal order is ultimately supreme; the national or the 
supranational? Beale identified that the issues of sovereignty and territoriality are inextricably 
linked to the power to tax, ‘[t]he sovereign who has power to tax is that sovereign who by 
                                                     
5 Owen Patterson MP, ‘it is worth remembering the comment made by Professor Vernon Bogdanor, which I 
mentioned earlier. He taught the Prime Minister a little something. He said that “one purpose of a 
referendum…is to secure legitimacy for decisions where Parliament alone can not secure that legitimacy.” 
Hansard HC vol 599, col 110 (7 September 2015). 
6 Maria Kendrick, ‘EU referendums and renegotiations’, eutopia law, 15 September 2015 on Matrix Chambers 
blog, https://eutopialaw.com/2015/09/15/eu-referendums-and-renegotiations/ (accessed 25 September 2016). 
7 Although there are many ways to describe referendums, including, for example, ‘plebiscite’, the term ‘direct 
democracy’ is used here in reference to the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee inquiry 
entitled ‘Lessons Learned from the EU Referendum’ as the scope of the inquiry includes exploration of ‘The 
role and purpose of referendums and the relationship between direct and parliamentary democracy’. The 
Committee has also invited written evidence to be submitted on the role and purpose of referendums, including 
questions such as ‘What is the relationship between direct democracy and the UK's tradition of representative 
democracy?’ and ‘What is the legal status of referendums and what questions are appropriate to be determined 
by referendums?’ Information available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-
z/commons-select/public-administration-and-constitutional-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2015/lessons-
learned-eu-referendum-launch-16-17/ (accessed 11 September 2016). 
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personal ownership of the territory has the general control of it.’8 Fiscal sovereignty, as far as 
the Member States are concerned, includes the freedom to design and enforce policies on 
taxation. This is certainly true for the UK and as tax is the traditional province of the State, any 
intrusion, whether apparent or indeed illusory, can be acutely felt: 
 
The power to tax, both as a means of gathering revenue and as an instrument of 
economic management, is one of the most basic and jealously guarded prerogatives of 
the state, and it might be expected that the Member States would be reluctant to allow 
the Community to trespass on their jurisdiction in this area. How a Member State raises 
the money necessary for the functions of its government is, it might be argued, entirely 
its own affair … its system of taxation is no business of other states or of supranational 
organizations.9 
 
This statement could be considered a presentation of the opinions of at least some of the Leave 
campaigners. However, the writers, Paul Farmer and Richard Lyal, continue by describing this 
opinion as ‘wholly untenable’.10 They do so because in a Union, and indeed a globalised world, 
where the intention is to maximise and encourage free trade, a protectionist stance in relation 
to taxation and trade barriers would be illogical. Consequently, what is revealing about the 
roles played by taxation and sovereignty in the referendum are the practical considerations 
surrounding the constitutional theory. The debate on sovereignty does not occur in a vacuum. 
In reality, it is the economic expediencies that will be an unavoidable influence on post 
referendum policy decisions. The attachment between the constitutional theorising on 
sovereignty in relation to taxation, and its practical considerations will now be addressed in 
relation to a concept that relates to the question of sovereignty, but which received 
comparatively fewer references during the referendum campaign; flexibility.  
 
In referring to the concept of flexibility, this article is referring to those arrangements which 
govern the UK’s membership of the European Union and that have made provision for the 
constitutional preferences of the UK. A pertinent example was discussed in the recent House 
of Commons debates on the Finance Bill 2015–16 to 2016-17 in the context of the 5% reduced 
rate of VAT, which applies to a pre-defined list of certain goods and services as a matter of EU 
law.11 It has, for some time, been the desire of a selection of MPs to see the UK provided with 
the flexibility to apply the 5% reduced rate, and the zero % super-reduced rate, to those goods 
and services which the UK Parliament deems appropriate, as and when it deems it appropriate. 
As a sovereign legislature, it can be argued, it is important that Parliament be able to decide 
the rate of tax, even in relation to VAT, which is a tax that not only applies to the EU Member 
States but has also been adopted in other countries around the world.  
 
These varied VAT rates originally stem from ‘transitional’ arrangements which the UK, among 
other Member States, agreed with the EU in the context of harmonization of VAT rates in the 
                                                     
8 Beale (n3) 587-8. See also Professor Sir Francis Jacobs, ‘General Editor’s Foreword’ in Paul Farmer and 
Richard Lyal (eds), EC Tax Law (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1994).   
9 Paul Farmer and Richard Lyal (eds), EC Tax Law (Clarendon Press Oxford, 1994) 1. 
10 Ibid, 2. 
11 Agreement on legislation to harmonize VAT rates across Member States was reached in June 1991, and 
provided by Directive 92/77/EEC of 19 October 1992. As part of this agreement, Member States have the option 
of applying a reduced rate of a minimum of 5% to certain specified goods, as listed in Annex H of the Directive. 
These provisions are now incorporated in Article 98 and Annex III of what is known as the principal VAT 
Directive, Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of Value Added Tax 
OJ L 347/1, 11 as amended by Council Directive 2009/47/EC of 5 May 2009 amending Directive 2006/112/EC 
as regards reduced rates of value added tax OJ L 116/18. 
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internal market.12 A form of flexibility arrangement, the UK maintained its selection of reduced 
rates on certain products in the face of a desire by the Commission to achieve complete 
harmonization in the internal market in relation to VAT. However, the Commission has 
subsequently published its ‘Action Plan on VAT’ in April 2016,13 and although space precludes 
a detailed discussion of the proposals contained in the Action Plan, suffice it for present 
purposes to highlight the comment made by the Commission in relation to the continuation of 
the flexibility arrangements of the Member States, including the UK. In its Q&A document, 
the Commission stated in response to the question ‘Will you scrap zero or reduced rates?’ that 
‘No. This proposal aims to modernise VAT rates policy and give more flexibility to Member 
States on VAT rates. It is not about scrapping existing reduced (or zero) rates.’14 This has not, 
however, satisfied the Eurosceptic Conservative MPs, some of whom remain convinced that 
the Commission does not intend to provide more flexibility, rather ‘the whole thing was steered 
towards more rigidity, harmonization and uniformity…’.15  
 
Does the level of flexibility purportedly on offer from the Commission in the Action Plan 
actually further undermine the Leave campaign’s argument on sovereignty? Unsurprisingly, in 
light of the conduct of the referendum campaign, not all MPs agree. On the question as to 
whether Parliament should just legislate now in the Finance Act 2016 2015-2016 to 2016-
201716, before the invocation of Article 50, to establish its own deadline for the removal of 
VAT on selected products and services, an action presumably premised on a reassertion of 
legislative sovereignty, Jane Ellision MP stated that to do so ‘would impose a requirement on 
the Government to act illegally. We would be in breach of Articles 1 and 110 of the Principal 
VAT Directive’.17 It appeared that practical considerations were not far behind concerns 
regarding sovereignty, ‘[w]hatever Members’ views are of what the Directive requires … I 
would be surprised if the Members of Her Majesty’s Official Opposition, or indeed any 
Member of the House, thought we could disregard it at such a crucial juncture, when the 
disregarding of the Commission’s and other nation’s obligations towards us could be 
significantly against the UK’s national interest’.18    
 
Disquiet and dissatisfaction as to the level of flexibility on offer, or potentially on offer, would 
seem to originate from the aspect of the sovereignty debate that objects to harmonization. For 
many years it has been the EU’s, and specifically the Commission’s, intention to harmonize 
indirect taxes, especially VAT, in order to remove barriers to trade in the internal market. 
However, this has aroused disagreement on the part of Eurosceptics (not just British 
Eurosceptics) who disagree with harmonization as a constitutional concept. A corollary of the 
territoriality argument, the development of policies on the approximation of laws on taxation 
are symptomatic of a loss of control. 
 
However, the desire to assert sovereignty and escape the harmonizing intentions of the Union, 
cannot be detached from practical considerations, particularly in relation to tax and economics. 
It is revealing to observe the post referendum response to tax harmonization. As the new 
                                                     
12 For more detail on the historic application of VAT rates see HC Library Briefing Paper Number 2683, 20 
May 2016, by Antony Seely. 
13 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/vat/action-plan-vat_en (accessed 29 September 
2016). 
14 European Commission MEMO 16-1024, Action Plan on VAT: Q&A, 7 April 2016 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-1024_en.htm (accessed 29 September 2016). 
15 Christopher Chope MP, Hansard HC vol 614, col 165 (5 September 2016). 
16 The Bill received Royal Assent on 15 September 2016. 
17 Jane Ellison MP, Hansard HC vol 614, col 169-70 (5 September 2016). 
18 Ibid.  
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Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, The Rt Hon David Davis MP, made a 
ministerial statement to the House of Commons on 5 September 2016 on the work of the new 
Department.19 Following this statement, the Minister took questions on the post referendum 
reality, including on the subject of tax generally and VAT specifically. The Minister’s 
responses were discussed later that day in the House of Commons debates on the Finance Bill 
2015–16 to 2016-17, which featured a Government tabled amendment20 setting a deadline for 
a VAT rate reduction as ‘the earliest date that may be appointed consistently with the United 
Kingdom’s EU obligations.’21 Paula Sherriff MP pointed out that the meaning of the 
amendment is that forthcoming Brexit negotiations may include an agreement to maintain that 
VAT rates be set by the European Union. She continued by stating that, ‘when I challenged the 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union on that earlier today, he certainly did not 
rule it out. Instead, he reflected that ability to set a zero rate was just one reason why people 
may have voted to leave, but did not actually pledge to deliver it’.22 It therefore appears, in 
stark contrast to the statement quoted at the beginning of this article, that those in favour of the 
UK leaving the EU for reasons of tax sovereignty, would not maintain the vehemence of their 
criticism of the EU in practice, in light of the post referendum economic reality.  
 
III. HARMONIZATION 
 
It has transpired from the discussion above in relation to taxation and sovereignty, that flexible 
arrangements are not necessarily flexible enough for those with a distinct objection to the EU’s 
harmonizing objectives. They are either considered insufficient in terms of retaining Member 
State control over taxation policy, or there is scepticism as to their underlying rationale. 
However, the consequence of the application of practical considerations is that legal 
sovereignty can be limited outside the EU by economic dependency in the post referendum 
reality. Therefore, the constitutional theory behind Brexit, including the Parliamentary 
Sovereignty paradox, and the practical considerations of Brexit, particularly the economic 
reality of leaving the EU, can conflict. This certainly makes the view of the Leave campaign 
quoted at the beginning of this article appear naïve at best. To challenge this argument further, 
it is necessary to consider the interrelationship between harmonization and sovereignty in more 
detail. 
 
The opinion was expressed at the start of this article that a corollary to the issue of territoriality 
is the issue of harmonization, which denotes an eradication of difference within the territory in 
which it applies and subsequently the loss of individual member state control. This is 
particularly pertinent in relation to taxation. In the famous Marks & Spencer case23 Advocate 
General Maduro opined that legislative harmonization may have the objective of correcting 
market distortions, however, he identified the conflict that may exist ‘between the power 
conferred on the Member States to tax income arising in their territory and the freedom 
conferred on Community nationals’24 (emphasis original) as a result of market harmonization.  
Thus, the issue of territoriality, which is an aspect of sovereignty, ‘gives rise to a tension 
                                                     
19 A full transcript of the statement can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/exiting-the-
european-union-ministerial-statement-5-september-2016 (accessed 30 September 2016). 
20 The amendment was referred to as amendment number 161 at that time and regarded the lowering of the VAT 
rate on women’s sanitary products to zero%. 
21 Hansard HC vol 614, col 162 onwards (5 September 2016). 
22 Ibid. 
23 ECJ, 13 December 2005, Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v David Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of 
Taxes), ECR I-10837. 
24 Opinion of AG Maduro, 7 April 2005, in Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer v David Halsey (Her Majesty’s 
Inspector of Taxes), ECR I-10840. 
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between two opposing systems and to the need to establish an equilibrium in the allocation of 
competences as between the Member States and the Community’.25 It is unfortunate that the 
Leave campaign, in focusing on the ‘boundary line is the line of sovereignty’26 aspect of 
constitutional theory, have risked highlighting rather than reducing this tension with the aim 
not of assisting the achievement of equilibrium but rather of compromising its achievement.  
 
Farmer and Lyal27 suggested, back in the mid-1990s, that both the need and nature of 
harmonization required in the EU is determined by the aims of the then European 
Community.28 However, because the impetus and objective behind harmonization is based on 
economic imperatives, the notions of the control aspect of sovereignty should be viewed in a 
different light alternative to this suggestion. The concept of the single market was not about 
Brussels controlling all aspects of the imposition of taxation on the citizens of the EU in order 
to render elected national politicians helpless, as the quote at the beginning of this article states. 
EU taxation policy is premised on the desire to bring about the elimination of fiscal obstacles 
in order to enable people, goods, services and capital to move freely across political frontiers, 
for their own economic benefit.29 Following the argument of this article, that practical 
considerations do not always complement but rather conflict with constitutional theory, it is 
unsurprising that one of the economic expediencies affecting post Brexit referendum taxation 
policy decisions is the necessity to maintain, or even increase, domestic tax revenues. In fact, 
this may well be the influential factor precipitating what appears to be a change of perspective 
on the role played by elected British politicians in setting rates of taxation in the UK by the 
Leave campaign. Contrary to that campaign’s propoundment, we have seen that there is 
evidence, in the form of a response to a Parliamentary question, that in the face of a potential 
decrease in revenue the EU’s approach to VAT does not look so objectionable.  
 
In actual fact it is ironic to observe that the ultimate outcome of the practical considerations of 
Brexit could be harmonization through the unilateral action of Member States. Professor Rita 
de la Fiera, has suggested that what influences the harmonization of VAT systems across the 
EU is the economic imperative of revenue raising and that this is actually more effective than 
the legislative endeavours of the Commission.30 De la Fiera describes the economic imperative, 
‘[r]eviewing the rate structure has been part of every Commission’s attempt to reform the EU 
VAT system—and with good reason. A recent study commissioned by the EU Commission 
indicates that a 50% reduction in the dissimilarity in VAT rates structures between Member 
States could result in a rise of 9.8% in intra-EU trade and an increase in real GDP of 1.1%’.31 
She continues to identify however that, ‘these studies in themselves have traditionally been 
insufficient to convince Member States to act. On the contrary, what has now made many 
Member States act at a domestic level has been the pressing need for extra revenue’.32 The 
statistics are very revealing ‘[s]ince 2009 twenty-five of the thirty-three OECD countries have 
increased their VAT rates, resulting in a broad convergence of VAT standard rates across the 
EU around the 20% mark.’ An unforeseen practical consequence of the sovereignty argument 
which effectively runs counter to the stance of the Leave campaign expressed in the quote at 
                                                     
25 Ibid, ECR I-10841. 
26 Beale (n3) 588. 
27 Farmer and Lyal (n9). 
28 Farmer and Lyal (n9) 8. 
29 Farmer and Lyal (n9) 8. 
30 Rita de la Fiera, EU VAT Rate Structure: towards unilateral convergence?, Oxford Centre for Business 
Taxation Working Paper WP13/05, 2013. 
31 Ibid, 18. The Commission Study referred to is: European Commission, A Retrospective Evaluation of 
Elements of the EU VAT System, December 2011. 
32 Rita de la Fiera (n30) 18. 
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the beginning of this article, is that the ‘latest developments raise the possibility that Europe 
might be finally entering a process of convergence of VAT rate structures, not by EU initiative 
but by domestic necessity’.33 
 
Another unforeseen but far more unfortunate consequence of the constitutional theory on 
sovereignty propounded by the Leave campaign is the impact on cross-border trade between 
the UK and the Republic of Ireland. One possible post referendum reality is that a ‘hard border’ 
may be imposed between Northern Ireland, as part of a UK terminating its membership of the 
EU, and the Republic of Ireland, which will remain a Member State. This could potentially 
involve customs border controls. The practical consequence is that either tariff barriers, or more 
likely non-tariff barriers, would follow. It is therefore relevant to briefly consider this feature 
of the cross-border element of taxation in the context of harmonization. 
 
The EU’s perspective on harmonization is that it is necessary in order to allow businesses to 
operate freely, raising capital throughout the Union.34 Harmonization therefore enables 
movement across frontiers. This is as true in relation to the removal of obstacles to trade that 
may result from company taxation as it is in relation to VAT.35 Distortions to cross-border trade 
can therefore occur in general because of a lack of a harmonized tax base and tax rates. 
Distortions can also occur because of specific obstacles which can affect cross-border 
investment, such as withholding taxes on cross-border dividends, interest payments and 
royalties, the absence of an extension of tax relief to cross-border operations, and double 
taxation of profits. All these obstacles and distortions can occur simply as a result of an 
interaction between differing national tax systems.36 
 
Non-tariff barriers in particular, were defined broadly by the OECD as: ‘all measures other 
than tariffs that restrict or otherwise distort trade flows.’37 Given the breadth of this definition, 
it is likely that some forms of non-tariff barriers would be imposed at the UK border with the 
Republic of Ireland.38 This is especially so should the UK follow a ‘hard Brexit’39 option. In 
these circumstances it is unlikely that the issue will be fully resolved by simply relying on the 
application of the WTO rules, as has been suggested by several well-known Leave 
campaigners. Although a detailed discussion of the WTO rules and the situation of the UK in 
relation to them, is beyond the scope of this article, suffice it for present purposes to say that 
the WTO itself is not at as far a stage of discouraging non-tariff barriers as some may assume. 
Negotiations on a new Trade Facilitation Agreement finally reached a conclusion in December 
2013, having commenced as long ago as July 2004.40 It was anticipated that improvements to 
GATT 94 designed to alleviate the situation in relation to non-tariff barriers to trade would be 
included in section I of the Agreement. The Agreement on Trade Facilitation set the deadline 
                                                     
33 Rita de la Fiera (n30) 1. 
34 Farmer and Lyal (n9) 10. 
35 Space precludes detailed discussion on both the historic and the present EU proposals on harmonization in the 
sphere of company taxation. For further elaboration on this subject see Terra and Wattel, European Tax Law, 
sixth edn (Kluwer Law International, 2012). 
36 Farmer and Lyal (n9) 10. 
37 OECD Trade Policy Studies, Looking beyond tariffs: the role of non-tariff barriers in world trade, 2005, The 
Executive Summary, 11.  
38 On the impact of customs related non-tariff barriers see T. Lyons QC, The Interaction of Customs and Non-
tariff Barriers, in C. Herrmann et al. (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic Law, (Springer, 
2015) 21. 
39 A colloquialism referring to the UK exiting the single market completely as a result of the referendum result. 
See further http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37500140 (accessed 30 September 2016). 
40 See T. Lyons QC (n38) 20. 
8 
 
of 31 July 2014 for the insertion of a Protocol of Amendment in Annex 1A of the WTO 
Agreement. However, a consensus on the agreement could not be reached between the 
members in time and therefore a further agreement on an amended protocol text was required 
but was not reached until November 2014.41 As the Agreement only comes into force when 
two-thirds of WTO members have completed their domestic ratification processes, further 
delays have occurred. At the time of writing the number of member signatories is still short of 
the overall number required.42 Consequently, it is likely that the UK will need some form of 
bilateral association agreement with the EU that addresses customs tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers. From a practical perspective, this would be in order to avoid less favourable treatment 
to its imports into the Republic of Ireland. It is also necessary in order to avoid the 
constitutionally unthinkable consequences for trade and travel over the Northern Irish and 
Republic of Ireland border. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This article started with a quote from the Vote Leave referendum campaign which was 
premised on the Parliamentary Sovereignty paradox. The practical considerations of the 
referendum, as they relate to taxation sovereignty, revealed that the EU does not legislate in a 
vacuum, and neither does the UK. Ultimately, it is becoming clear from the debates thus far 
held in the House of Commons that what happens in practice does not always reflect 
constitutional ideals. It appears conclusive that the reality of post Brexit economic expediencies 
will feature as an unavoidable influence on post referendum policy decisions, with potentially 
unfortunate consequences for the UK’s border with the Republic of Ireland.  
 
Should the UK agree in a Brexit deal with the EU to maintain part of the current economic 
reality, specifically in relation to taxation and especially VAT, this would presumably be in 
accordance with the Commission’s harmonization objective, although not necessarily 
including flexibility arrangements. As a concept which spans both constitutional and practical 
considerations, tax harmonization is ‘a difficult and sensitive process since it does not relate 
merely to technical issues … [but] reflects economic, social and political conditions and 
budgetary requirements’,43 which are often conflicting factors which Leave campaigners are 
realising are not easily controlled. The post referendum reality seems set to take a form contrary 
to the sentiments quoted at the beginning of this article. While this may please the present 
writer, it is a concern that the majority of voters look set to be disappointed.     
                                                     
41 See T. Lyons QC (n38) 20. 
42 See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news16_e/fac_28oct16_e.htm (accessed 28 October 2016). 
43 Farmer and Lyal (n9) 2. 
